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and the National 
Environmental 
Policy_A __ ct________ _ 
A meltdown at an experimental breeder reactor 
outside Detroit brought officials close to calling for the 
evacuation of the city's 1.5 million inhabitants. An 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) projection of 
damages from a nuclear accident at a hypothetical small 
nuclear power plant 30 miles from a city smaller than 
Detroit included 3,400 people killed and $7 billion in 
property damages. A subsequent report updating the 
projections has been suppressed. Congress, under heavy 
pressure from utilities and insurers, has passed the 
Price-Anderson Act limiting federal liability in the event 
of such an accident to $5 60 million. 
Howard Holme is a third year student at Yale Law 
School. 
Howard Holme 
The AEC's safety record with plutonium, the principal 
constitutent of breeder reactors, is appalling. A 1969 fire 
at the AEC plant outside Denver, where all plutonium 
triggers for American nuclear and thermonuclear 
weapons are made, released substantial amounts of 
plutonium into the environment. Increases in the general 
background radiation level may be causing an as yet 
uncharted rise in the incidence of cancer and leukemia. 
Yet the Atomic Energy Commission refuses to prepare 
an environmental impact statement on the breeder 
reactor program which may put more than two thousand 
giant r.eactors all over the United States. 
The style of this passage is severe. The juxtaposition 
of episodes and charges is alarmist. But the substance is 
accurate. In the nuclear energy policy of the Nixon 
Administration and the AEC, there may well be 
irresponsibility which merits serious public concern. 
This article considers the Federal Government's 
development program for breeder reactors in light of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which 
requires it to prepare statements of the environmental 
impact of major federal actions, policies and proposals 
for legislation. This paper emphasizes the controlled 
fusion reactor as an alternative to the breeder reactor. 
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A the same time that the importance of preservfng the -environment has become increasingly apparent, many people have 
become alarmed over a national "energy cfisis" and the 
rapid rate at which we are depleting fuels and other 
natural resources. Energy production, particularly 
electric energy production, will be crucial to the quality 
of our lives, if not to our survival. Between now and the 
year 2002 the United States will consume more energy 
than it has in its entire history and will be consuming 
twice as much energy in all forms as at present. 1 By the 
year 2000, projections anticipate, electricity will 
constitute 38 per cent of our total energy, compared 
with 25 per cent of a much smaller total today.2 Nuclear 
energy, when compared with energy produced from the 
burning of fossil fuels, is an attractive, apparently 
"cleaner" alternative. While nuclear energy provides 0.3 
per cent of our tptal energy today, it may provide nearly 
20 per cent of our total energy in 2000.3 
Present nuclear plants and those currently planned for 
commercial use are pressurized water fission reactors. 
These plants are expected to be supplanted (for reasons 
of economy, pollution and uranium depletion) by other 
types of nuclear reactors during the next 10 to 30 years. 
Two of the most likely candidates for commercial use 
are the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) and 
the controlled thermonuclear fusion reactor. 
The LMFBR is a fission reactor fueled with plutonium 
oxide and uranium oxide in which fissile plutonium 
atoms split apart emitting neutrons which continue a 
chain reaction by splitting other plutonium atoms. More 
neutrons are emitted than are needed to continue the 
reaction, and these neutrons are captured by nonfissile 
atoms of uranium 238, transforming them into 
plutonium atoms which form the fuel for other reactors. 
Because more plutonium will be formed than will be 
used up, the reactor will be a "breeder." The splitting of 
the atoms also releases a great deal of heat which is 
absorbed by liquid sodium and used to heat steam to 
drive turbines and produce electricity. 
A controlled thermonuclear fusion reactor would fuse 
the nuclei of isotopes of hydrogen (deuterium and 
tritium), forming helium and releasing heat as well as 
neutrons to split lithium atoms into tritium atoms to 
continue the process. The fusion reactor could produce 
electricity indirectly with a conventional turbine or, 
some researchers hope, directly with a device to trap 
charged particles.4 
Since 1946, the AEC has built five breeders, spending 
altogether $650 million.5 And according to current 
projections, another $3.3 billion must be spent in order 
for the LMFBR to become commercially feasible by 
1986.6 
Although the AEC's 1962 report to the President 
pointed to the breeder's promise, and its 1967 report 
established the LMFJBR as its highest priority civilian 
reactor development effort, until February 1971, the 
AEC's internal priority was not reflected in breeder 
program funding. 7 In March 1971, however, President 
Nixon received a report from the Energy Policy 
Subcommittee of the~ Domestic Council which recom-
mended development of breeder reactors. Because of 
that report, and perhaps (it is charged) for extraneous 
political reasons, the Nixon Administration "decided 
that instead of pressing for the development of 'clean' 
fusion reactors, it will throw heavy budgetary support 
behind" the liquid metal cooled fast breeder reactors.8 
In June 1971, President Nixon's Message to Congress on 
Energy Policy announced plans to build the first 
LMFBR demonstration plant while asking for no new 
funds for research in controlled fusion.9 In September, 
President Nixon announced the decision to build a 
second breeder demonstration plant. 10 In January 1972, 
the AEC announced that the first breeder would be built 
and operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority and 
Commonwealth Edison Company of Chicago. 11 
T he focus of our concerns in this sequence of developments is the decision embodied in the June Message to Congress which, for the first 
time, stated a "commitment to complete the successful 
demonstration of the liquid metal fast breeder reactor 
by 1980" and,accepted the AEC priority to make the 
breeder the nation's power source for the future, which 
would mean the building of 2600 breeder plants by the 
year 2020. 12 In the June message Nixon requested an 
additional $77 million for the breeder programs, $27 
million in fiscal year 1972 for technological develop-
ment of the AEC's liquid metal fast breeder reactor 
program and $50 million for the demonstration plant.13 
This set the level of appropriations for the AEC reactor 
development programs, as reflected in the Senate 
Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1972 (July 31, 
1971), at $430 million, of which $340 million was for 
breeder reactors. 14 
Nixon also announced his request for "the early 
preparation and review by all appropriate agencies of a 
draft environmental impact statement for the breeder 
demonstration plant in accordance with Section 102 of 
the National Environmental Policy Act" to "ensure 
compliance with all environmental quality standards 
before plant construction begins." 15 
In contrast with the long statement and large budget 
for breeder reactors, Nixon's comments on controlled 
thermonuclear fusion were few. He requested no 
additional money at the time of the statement, though 
in regular budget requests he had asked for $2 million 
extra. 16 Fusion research has been funded at a level 
allowing about the same number of man-years of effort 
since the mid 1960's, but the fusion funding of $30 
million in 1970 reflects the gap that, relative to breeder 
funding, has been growing every year since 1966.17 
These commitments to major federal spending and to 
the development of a whole new technology were 
followed in July 1971 by the AEC Draft Environmental 
Statement for Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor 
Demonstration Plant which deals with a single unspeci-
fied breeder reactor. The AEC has not yet made the 
Statement final, nor has it prepared any other environ-
mental statement dealing with the breeder reactor 
363 
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program as a whole .18 
The substantive inadequacies of the Draft Statement 
in its own terms will be discussed at length later. The 
President's recommendations, by their heavy emphasis 
on the funding of breeder reactor development, imply a 
commitment to the breeder, largely to the exclusion of 
alternative future sources of energy. That broader 
commitment suggests that the AEC Draft Statement was 
far too narrow for what was really being recommended. 
There needs to be an environmental evaluation of the 
whole breeder program, not just a single breeder plant. 
And, indeed, in May 1971 the Scientists' Institute for 
Public Information, Inc. (SIPI), a group of 35 distin-
guished scientists led by Drs. Barry Commoner and 
Margaret Mead, filed suit against the AEC to require the 
preparation of a NEPA 102 (2){C) Statement for the 
liquid metal fast breeder reactor program.19 
While all of Section 102 is set out in the notes, the 
crux is as follows: 
"all agencies of the Federal Government shall - ... 
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for 
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting 
the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by 
the responsible official on -
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided 
should the proposals be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's 
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of 
long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be 
implemented." 20 
The act is limited in application to only some kinds of 
documents, statements and actions, that is, to "recom-
mendations or reports on proposals for legislation and 
other major Federal actions" drafted by any federal 
agency. In this Message to Congress Nixon was setting 
out his "program," including "a commitment to 
complete the successful demonstration of the liquid 
metal fast breeder reactor by 1980." 21 Surely this 
constitutes a recommendation for legislation. That 
Nixon's major recommendations as to specific legislation 
were to increase certain pre-existing budgets does not 
keep them from being recommendations on proposed 
legislation. Appropriations are among the most 
important types of legislation. 
While it seems clear that the Energy Message and its 
underlying decision included recommendations for 
legislation, they also fall within the other heading, 
"major federal action." The Energy Message and breeder 
program fall within the definition of "actions" of the 
Guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ) as appropriations, as projects or continuing 
activities supported by the Federal government and 
requiring Federal licenses and as policy. 22 
Moreover, the impact statement requirement cannot 
be avoided or narrowed in focus by a claim that the 
proposals are preliminary or experimental or that a 
single breeder is insignificant to the full breeder 
program. Again according to the CEQ Guidelines, 
whether or not an item is a "major federal action" is to 
be decided "with a view to the overall, cumulative 
impact of the action proposed (and of further actions 
contemplated)" and should include "proposed actions 
the environmental impact of which is likely to be highly 
controversial."" ... [T)he effect of many Federal 
decisions about a project or complex of projects may be 
individually limited but cumulatively considerable" as 
" ... when one decision involving a limited amount of 
money is a precedent for action in much larger cases or 
represents a decision in principle about a future major 
course of action .... " 23 
The argument that a statement on each breeder as it is 
built will suffice as to the whole program is answered by 
the Guidelines: 
Agencies will need to identify at what stage or stages of a 
series of actions relating to a particular matter the environmental 
statement procedures of this directive will be applied. It will 
often be necessary to use the procedures both in the develop-
ment of a national program and in the review of proposed 
projects within the national program.24 
Behind these official interpretations of Section 102 of 
the NEPA is a plain intent to inject concern for 
environmental considerations into all stages of agency 
deliberations. The CEQ Guidelines put it simply: 
The principle to be applied is to obtain views of other agencies 
at the earliest feasible time in the development of program and 
project proposals. 25 
Judge Wright's opinion in the case of Clavert Cliffs' 
Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, the most 
important interpretation of the NEPA to date, likewise 
confirms this view of the statutory requirements for 
timing and scope of environmental impact statements.26 
This then is the intent ofNEPA's draft requirement. The ca~ for ~ts applica~ion to the AEC and to the President m the specific matter 
of the Energy Message proposals for the breeder reactor 
program ought now to be considered. To begin with, the 
involvement of the Presidency in the presentation of the 
appropriations proposals should not be made a ground 
for exempting them from the NEPA draft requirement. 
The environmental impact statement requirements apply 
to "all agencies of the Federal Government," and the 
CEQ Guidelines are directed toward "Federal depart-
ments, agencies and establishment.<;." 27 Thus, if an 
agency, like the AEC, has failed to draft an adequate 
environmental impact statement for its proposal, the 
President should not act on the proposal by sending it to 
Congress. Of course, neither the AEC nor the President 
prepared or considered an environmental impact 
statement in deciding to recommend the greatly 
increased breeder reactor program. 
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The draft statement which the President announced 
he would request from the AEC would only be able to 
guide Congress, not the AEC or the President, in the 
decision. Even should the President be exempt 
personally, the AEC is clearly an agency within the 
terms of NEPA. The environmental statement required 
for the breeder program (or plant) should have been 
prepared long before the decision reached the Presi-
dential level, for the Act states that the detailed 
statement "shall accompany the proposal through the 
existing agency review process." 28 Yet here, judging by 
the President's remarks in his Energy Message, no draft 
statement was prepared at the time the agency or the 
President made the decision to recommend. There is not 
the slightest doubt of the Act's applicability to the AEC, 
as is demonstrated by the decision in the Calvert Cliffs' 
case. Both individual administrative decisions, such as 
the building of a particular plant, and th~ general 
procedures by which such plants will be evaluated are 
subject to the Act's language and relevant judicial 
decisions. 
Nor is there any doubt that the AEC will have to go to 
Congress with requests for appropriations to carry out 
the research and development of breeder reactors. 
Nixon's Energy Message requested $77 million of 
supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 1972. The 
AEC, however, is not persuaded that the NEPA requires 
it to draft an impact statement for the whole projected 
breeder reactor program beyond the one it drafted in 
July 1971. 
As mentioned earlier, on May 25, 1971, the Scientists' 
Institute for Public Information filed suit against the 
AEC in the District of Columbia29 asking for a 
declaratory judgment that the AEC had failed to comply 
with Section 102 of the NEPA and mandamus directing 
the AEC to prepare and circulate an impact statement 
on the whole breeder program. 
In the answer to the SIPI complaint, the AEC claims 
three defenses, all appearing to be restatements of the 
same theme. The first defense is that the complaint 
"fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." 
The second is that the AEC's Draft Statement of July 
1971, while dealing with the prospective demonstration 
plant project, necessarily discusses and considers the 
broader aspects of the entire program. The authorization 
of appropriation funds for the program will only allow 
the Commission to continue its base research program, 
which has been in existence for 20 years. Thus, as far as 
this program is concerned, no major actions which will 
significantly affect the environment will be taken until 
defendants actually enter into a demonstration plant 
agreement or prior to the construction of a demonstra-
tion plant." 30 The third defense is that the Draft 
Statement made the case "moot." 
The defendants seem to claim that the breeder 
program as a whole is exempt because it was started 
before the NEPA (which they allege is not retroactive) 
was passed. They argue that any new appropriations, 
proposals for legislation or other actions are satisfied by 
their Draft Environmental Impact Statement of July 
1971. But more basically, the AEC appears to feel that it 
is not required to file environmental impact statements 
for any actions other than the licensing and operation of 
specific facilities. In its own guidelines issued as a 
response to the Calvert Cliffs' decision (the AEC did not 
appeal the decision), no mention is made of impact 
statements for policies, proposed legislation, appropria-
tions, continuing programs or other broad questions.31 
This position contrasts with the language of the NEPA 
which refers to "the policies, regulations and public laws 
of the United States" and with the Guidelines of the 
CEQ as quoted earlier. The whole Act is designed for 
long-term actions as well as short-term actions and for a 
broad rather than narrow geographical scope. Consider 
these examples of its language: "requirements of present 
and future generations of Americans," "continuing 
responsibility of the Federal Government," "responsi-
bilities of each generation as trustee of the environment 
for succeeding generations," "the relationship between 
local short-term uses of man's environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term produc-
tivity," "recognize the worldwide and long-range 
character of environmental problems" and "quality of 
mankind's world environment." 32 
Finally, the holding in Calvert Cliffs' confirms this 
broad view. It upheld the Act's applicability not only to 
the particular decision of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion in granting a construction permit or an operating 
license but also to "the Commission's recently promul-
gated rules which govern consideration of environmental 
values in all such individual decisions." 33 Like the rules, 
the breeder policy decision has implications reaching far 
beyond the individual plant-by-plant decisions, 
implications which would affect the environment 
profoundly. 
I o turn briefly to the problem of the retro-activity of the NEPA, the argument of the AEC in their answer to the SIPI complaint appears to y the establishment of a priority breeder reactor 
program before the passage of the NEPA as evidence 
that an environmental statement is not necessary. In 
support of that position, the AEC cites U.S. interest in 
breeders beginning in the early l 940's and the 1962 and 
1967 reports to the President which "reaffirmed the 
promise of the breeder for meeting our long-term energy 
needs and established the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder 
Reactor (LMFBR) program as the AEC's highest priority 
civilian reactor development effort." 34 
Even if the decision to embark on a large-scale 
development of breeder reactors were made before the 
NEPA became law, which is doubtful in view of the 
relatively low appropriations for the breeder program 
before the Energy Message, the Council on Environ-
mental Quality's Guidelines require NEPA procedures. 
"To the maximum extent practicable the section 102 
(2)(C) procedure should be applied to further major 
Federal actions having a significant effect on the 
environment even though they ::irise from projects or 
365 
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programs initiated prior to enactment of the Act on 
January 1, 1970. Where it is not practicable to reassess 
the basic course of action, it is still important that 
further incremental major actions be shaped so as to 
minimize adverse environmental consequences. It is also 
important in further action that account be taken of 
environmental consequences not fully evaluated at the 
outset of the project or program." 35 It would be wise 
and ?racticable to reassess the whole breeder program, 
particularly in view of the major new emphasis on 
spending that is being given it. At the very least, the 
present steps to increase the program are "further 
incremental actions" which should be evaluated 
environmentally, allowing further notice to be taken of 
environmental consequences not evaluated earlier.36 
It is true that some cases have held that the NEPA is 
not to be applied retroactively, particularly in the 
context of highway projects.37 However, even these 
cases require the program to be relatively near comple-
tion before it can avoid the required environmental 
impact statement. 
The entire breeder reactor program is not sufficiently 
near completion to escape the requirement.38 The 
decision to build breeder plants for commercial use 
changes the program from experimental research to a 
massive national effort.39 The breeders that have been 
built are one-twentieth the size of those projected.40 
While five or six have been built, the AEC predicts that 
500 more will be operating by the year 2000 and 2,600 
by the year 2020.41 The first commercial breeder is not 
expected until the year 1986. No company has even 
been selected to build the first of at least two and 
perhaps several, demonstration plants to prec~ed the 
first commercial reactor.42 The appropriate comparison 
with the highway construction program would be to ask 
whether the fact that the country had built many "U.S. 
highways" before the "interstate system" was started 
would have foreclosed the necessity of an environmental 
impact statement concerning the interstate system. The 
interstate system's impact on the environment was so 
much greater than the previous road system's, whether 
for better or worse, that the answer is clearly that a new 
impact statement would have been necessary. The 
breeder reactors being contemplated, in size and 
number, are also so much different from anything that 
has been built up to now that a new environmental 
impact statement dealing with the whole program should 
be required. 
Implicit in the AEC's position are arguments that have 
already been rejected in the Calvert Cliffs' decision. The 
AEC has implied that one reason it is reluctant to go 
into environmental matters is that it would take a lot of 
time. The AEC, in fact, argued in the Calvert Cliffs' case 
that the phrase, "to the fullest extent possible," in the 
act (Sec. 102) made compliance "discretionary." Judge 
Wright replied, "this language does not provide an escape 
hatch for footdragging agencies; it does not make 
NEPA's procedural requirements somehow "discre-
tionary." 43 "Considerations of administrative difficulty, 
delay, or economic cost will not suffice to strip the 
section of its fundamental importance." 44 As to the 
Commission's argument in that earlier case for the need 
for an "orderly transition" to the NEPA procedures, 
Judge Wright responded, "the obvious sense of urgency 
on the part of Congress should make clear that a 
transition, however 'orderly,' must proceed at a pace 
faster than a funeral procession." 45 
There is also the major fear of the power industry, the 
AEC and others that there is no time for careful 
consideration of alternatives in the face of a growing 
energy crisis.46 To this, the Calvert Cliffs' decision says: 
"In the end, the Commission's long delay (in adopting pro-
cedures for preparing l 02 statements) seem based upon what it 
believes to be a pressing national power crisis. Inclusion of 
environmental issues might have held up the licensing of some 
power plants for a time. But the very purpose of NEPA was to 
tell federal agencies that environmen ta! protection is as much a 
part of their responsibility as is protection and promotion of the 
industries they regulate. Whether or not the spectre of a national 
power crisis is as real as the Commission apparently believes it 
must not be used to create a blackout of environmental 
consideration in the agency review process." 4' 
W.th the lawyer's case against the AEC stated, it remains to be shown what may be at stake environmentally in the struggle to force the 
AEC's compliance with the NEPA. The inadequacies of 
the 1971 AEC draft impact statement are serious, and 
they obscure the real and sometimes terrifying hazards 
that lie in uninformed executive and congressive 
decisions which have environmental consequences. The 
most persistent blind spot in the impact statement is the 
none too impressive safety record of the AEC itself. 
To be fair, the AEC Draft Environmental Statement 
does at least mention most of the environmental impacts 
that should be considered: 48 waste heat production 
(thermal pollution), wastes from the demonstration 
plant itself, wastes from the demonstration plant fuel 
cycle, plutonium safety considerations, diversion of 
plutonium, radioactivity production, effects on 
terrestrial and biological eco-systems and land use and 
demographic changes. But the consideration of them is 
not at all detailed and thus does not provide the 
information necessary to carry out the purposes of the 
NEPA. 
To take one example, the Statement says that "the 
extreme toxic nature of plutonium is recognized and 
ad~quate preca~ tions are available to protect the public, 
as 1s the case with many other toxic or dangerous 
substances used in industry." 49 Unfortunately, the 
record of the AEC in handling plutonium is not spotless. 
On April 21, 1964, the AEC "lost" 2.2 pounds of 
plutonium 238 in a navigational satellite rocket that 
failed to orbit. The plutonium lost in this incident, if 
distributed evenly to all human beings, would be 
sufficient to kill them all.50 Plutonium was also lost in 
the crashes of nuclear weapons-bearing aircraft in Spain 
and Greenland. 
There was a disastrous fire on May 11, 1969 at the 
AEC facility operated by the Dow Chemical Company. 
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This plant, 21 miles from downtown Denver and five 
miles from Denver suburbs, is where all plutonium 
triggers for nuclear and thermonuclear weapons 
manufactured by the United States are made.51 The 
fire, said to be the most costly industrial accident in 
United States history, carried an unknown quantity of 
plutonium away from the plant. Despite the AEC's 
successive attempts to deny and then minimize the 
amount of plutonium that was lost, it now admits that 
substantial amounts did escape. Two AEC scientists, in 
an official report, said the amount of plutonium released 
might ha\'e been as great as 5 .8 curies, and the nuclear 
chemist who originally exposed the AEC coverups 
thought the amount to be over 15 curies.52 The 
"permissible" exposure to plutonium is 16 nanocuries 
(16 one-billionths of a curie j per lung, a standard which 
has been under severe attack by scientists and doctors as 
being much too -high. The AEC Director of Research and 
Ecology is, indeed, correct when he says, "the difference 
between 1, 6, or 15 curies is not significant from a 
public health standpoint." 53 What he does not bother to 
say, however, is that even one curie, if it were evenly 
distributed in human systems, would be ample to kill, 
not only the population of Denver, but of the whole 
Rocky Mountain area. The workers at the Dow plant are 
"routinely exposed" to plutonium in "accidents and 
small fires and explosions." According to management 
there were 70 small fires in 1969 and 35 in 1970.54 
Plutonium loses half its radioactivity only after 24,000 
years, so that any amount lost now will plague the earth 
indefinitely. 
The AEC report states that "one of the potential 
problems in working with plutonium, which arises in all 
stages in its fuel cycle, is the possibility of accidentally 
achieving a critical mass." 55 There has already been a 
fuel melt down and a similar serious accident in two of 
the very few breeder reactors that have ever operated. 
The meltdown occurred in the Enrico Fermi Power Plant 
in 1966 and was serious enough to require consideration 
of evacuating Detroit and its 1.5 million inhabitants.56 
The reason for considering evacuation is clear. The 
Fermi reactor held about 1,000 pounds of uranium, of 
which a very small amount, if it melted together, could 
cause the release of radioactivity far greater then 
explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The reactor was 
not inspected for 17 months after the accident for fear 
that the meltdown had created a critical mass. 57 
The type of breeder planned by the AEC would hold 
about 4,000 pounds of plutonium. If as little as 4 
pounds of this melted together ,.it could cause a critical 
mass and explosion. In the ABC's Brookhaven report, a 
1957 projection of damages from such a nuclear 
accident (in a conventional, non-breeder reactor) 
postulated an accident at a small, 100,000-200,000 
kilowatts electric, nuclear power plant located about 30 
miles from a city of one million people and projected 
3,400 people killed, 43,000 injured and $7 billion in 
damaged property. People could be killed at distances of 
15 miles and injured at 45 miles. Land contamination 
could extend over 150 ,000 square miles. 58 
It is not comforting that the government suppressed a 
subsequent report which updated the possibilities. The 
commercial breeder reactors are expected to be 5 to I 0 
times larger than the reactor postulated (or 1,000 
megawatts instead of 100 megawatts). Some modern 
reactors are being built much closer than 30 miles from 
large cities, (for example five miles from Trenton, 10 
miles from Philadelphia and 24 miles from New 
York).59 Some of these reactors are being built near 
metropolitan areas of populations closer to 10 milion 
people than 1 million. To contaminate 15,000 (or how 
many more?) square miles of the Eastern seaboard is to 
contaminate most of it. These predictions and AEC 
mishaps have provided the reason for passing the 
Price-Anderson Act which limited total liability for a 
radiological accident to $560 million.60 
The AEC Draft Environmental Statement mentions 
the production of excess radioactivity by breeder 
reactors. However, it does not reply to the charges made 
by two former AEC scientists in a book entitled 
Poisoned Power: The Case Against Nuclear Power 
Plants, 61 which attacks the idea that any level of 
additional environmental radiation is safe. They found 
that if the U.S. reached the present level of radiation 
allowed by the AEC of .17 rads per year average, we 
would have an additional 32,000 cases of fatal cancer 
and leukemia per year.62 While current levels of 
radiation are far below the permitted levels in most 
locations, the AEC opposes any attempt to lower the 
permissible radiation levels, perhaps because the addition 
of many breeder reactor plants around the country 
would greatly increase the existing radiation levels.63 
The Draft Statement admits that breeder reactors will 
necessitate very long-term (thousands of years) storage 
of high level radioactive wastes. It says, "The location 
proposed for this repository is adjacent to an abandoned 
salt mine near Lyons, Kansas. The natural geologic 
formation of bedded salt deposits provides ample 
assurance that materials placed therein will remain 
isolated from man's environment, with minimum 
surveillance, over geological periods of time." 64 The 
idea of using this repository in Lyons has been seriously 
attacked because of demonstrations that water leaks into 
the storage area could carry radioactivity into the water 
supply.65 
0 ne aspect of the plutonium fuel cycle the AEC Environmental Statement does not cover is the mining of uranium and plutonium. It has 
been a matter of some embarrassment to the AEC to 
have had it made public that; after extensive mining of 
nuclear fuelds in western Colorado, they invited 
construction crews of a whole town, Grand Junction, 
Colorado, to use mine tailing as a fill in construction 
projects.66 It has been found that this fill is highly 
radioactive, making many of the homes in that town 
unsafe for their inhabitants. The AEC is attempting to 
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avoid taking responsibility for this error to relocate 
those families whose health is in danger.67 Yet despite 
the AEC's having made most of the town unsafe to live 
in, its impact statement fails to refer to the dangers 
present in the mining part of the fuel cycle. 
Perhaps the most serious defect in the AEC Environ-
mental Statement is its trifling treatment of alternatives 
to breeder reactors. In this "alternatives" section of the 
statement the AEC wholly fails to consider the building 
of any kind of plant other than a breeder reactor, such 
as fusion reactors, conventional or other types of power 
plants, quite apart from failing to raise the possibility of 
reducing the astronomical growth of power consump-
tion. This narrow focus of the statement can be justified 
only on the theory that the report is meant to deal 
merely with a particular demonstration breeder reactor 
plant. It clearly does not compare alternatives to the 
whole breeder reactor program. This underlines the 
importance of the pending SIPI suit. The weighing of 
these broad alternatives is precisely what is to be gained 
by its successful prosecution against the AEC. 
The one discussion of alternative power sources comes 
in a three-page cursory and conclusionary glance at so 
many other potential sources of power that most, 
literally, get only one sentence. For example, the full 
section on fusion is the following: "According to the 
best judgment of most experts, there is little chance that 
alternative power producing systems, such as those 
utilizing solar and geothermal energy, tidal power or 
controlled thermonuclear fusion, or alternative power 
conversion systems, such as magnetohydrodynamics 
(MHD) and fuel cells will contribute significantly to the 
production of bulk power prior to the end of the 
century." ''The feasibility of controlled nuclear fusion 
for the production of electricity has not yet been 
demonstrated. It is unlikely that nuclear fusion will be a 
major contributor to power generation in this cen-
tury." 68 The first statement is not footnoted. The 
source of the second statement is a speech by Glenn 
Seaborg, former chairman of the AEC, entitled "The 
Erehwon Machine." But a citation of the head of the 
agency which is developing the breeder at the expense of 
all alternatives including fusion is rather like no citation 
at all. 
What makes these pronouncements especially 
misleading is that the date when fusion is developed 
depends to a great extent on the AEC, and thus any 
predictions by the AEC will become self-fulfilling 
prophesises unless challenged. The AEC has not 
increased fusion research (in terms of annual man-years) 
since 1964, despite tremendous research advances.69 
Yet, according to the AEC's Assistant Research Director, 
funding difficulties rather than scientific obstacles are 
currently limiting fusion progress. Modest investment of 
resources on exploratory studies of fusion reactor 
technology could materially reduce the time and cost of 
developing commercial fusion reactors.70 This is also a 
time when scientists and engineers are unemployed 
because of defense and aerospace cutbacks and would be 
available at reasonable salaries to do research in the 
fusion field. 
Finally, the AEC developed its priority program for 
the breeder and has maintained it without using the 
global and long-range criteria for the assessment of a 
program's impact that are required by the NEPA. One of 
two important criteria that appear not to have been 
considered carefully by the AEC is an assessment of the 
action from the NEPA's perspective that "each 
generation is trustee of the environment for succeeding 
generations." 71 If the breeder is simply a stopgap 
between the present reactors and fusion, then a really 
long-range assessment might lead to a different decision, 
for example, to stretch the uranium supply or to use 
more conventional power in order to avoid the 
possibility of killing future generations by the use of the 
terribly toxic plutonium. Another neglected criterion is 
Section 102 (2)(E) which requires the AEC, as a federal 
agency, to "recognize the worldwide and long-range 
character of environmental problems and, where 
consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, 
lend appropriate support to inititatives, resolutions, and 
programs designed to maximize international coopera-
tion in anticipating and preventing a decline in the 
quality of mankind's world environment." Since 
numerous other countries are involved in building 
breeders and in fusion research, the AEC should 
reevaluate the possibility of international cooperation as 
a means of reducing the U.S. effort or of making it more 
efficient.72 In addition, taking a global view of the 
problems of using plutonium instead of deuterium might 
lead to a reconsideration of the relative merits of breeder 
and fusion reactors. 
P erhaps fusion would be enough better in environmental terms that this country should concentrate its research on making it a reality 
at the expense of a rapid development of breeders which 
other countries will surely build, partly because they 
have advanced further in research on the breeder than 
we have. 73 The Soviet Union is well along in construc-
tion of a liquid metal fast breeder reactor twice as large 
as the proposed U. S. demonstration plant. In fact, six 
nations-Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Italy and Japan-may be ahead of us in this technology. 
All these except Japan expect to build commercial size 
reactors ( 1000 MWe) by 1981, five years before the 
U. S.74 The AEC seems to take the approach that our 
balance of payments and national pride require that we 
catch up to and beat these countries in another 
technology race. The NEPA suggests, as does the fact of 
an increasingly interdependent world, that greater 
cooperation and less competition might have beneficial 
effects not only on the environment but also on world 
peace and economic development. 75 
Although the AEC ought to consider in its draft 
statement the irreversible and irretrievable commitment 
of resources to this project, it considers only a particular 
breeder plant. There is no sensitivity in the discussion to 
the way in which building one breeder plant tends to 
commit the government to building other breeder plants, 
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to prevent the consideration of alternative energy 
sources, either conventional or fusion, and perhaps to 
lead to the building of thousands of breeder reactors all 
over the country. For if the AEC and the utilities invest 
significant amounts of money in \?reeder research and 
construction, they will be reluctant to change technol-
ogies before they have extracted their profits from the 
breeder program-which probably will be well after the 
turn of the century. 76 
As a matter of fact, the process of irretrievable 
commitments of resources has already begun. Since the 
preparation of the Draft Statement, the AEC has 
convinced President Nixon to announce that he would 
authorize the building of a second breeder demonstra-
tion.77 Nixon did this, in September 1971, not only 
without an environmental impact statement but without 
consulting most AEC officials, officials of the Office of 
Management and Budget, members of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy or represent~tives of the 
nuclear industry .78 Building two breeders will cost 
nearly $1,000,000,000 79 and perforce use nearly all of 
the AEC's research funds in that program while 
preventing the possible development of any other 
technology. These matters are not considered at all in 
the AEC Draft Statement. 
Unfortunately it would not be unprecedented for the 
federal government to put all its research eggs into one 
basket. For years about 83 per cent of federal energy 
research money has gone into radioactive power plant 
research, and almost nothing has been provided for other 
possible sources of power. In 1970 the government spent 
approximately $255 million on developing radioactive 
nuclear power plants, $30 million on developing fusion 
power, $300,000 on developing magnetohydrodynamic 
generators but nothing on developing geothermal 
technology or on developing solar energy.80 
This pattern of allocation of resources may exaggerate 
the largest apparent advantage the breeder has over 
fusion reactors-that it is technologically nearer 
commercial exploitation. But the AEC does not project 
that breeders will be ready to operate commercially until 
1986.81 Fusion reactors are expected to be ready for 
commercial use around 2000, 15 years later, though 
some optimists say they will be ready by 1990, and 
some pessimists, it must be admitted, say never.82 
The brevity of the period for which it is projected that 
breeders will be available-and fusion reactors will be 
unavailable or not environmentally and economically 
superior-is very important.83 
General Electric and Westinghouse invested over $300 
million in light water reactors (the kind presently in use) 
in the 1950s and 1960s, but it is only within the last 
year that the companies have begun to generate a 
positive cash flow on their reactors.84 The same 
problem is already developing with regard to the 
breeder. In successive steps, the Nixon administration 
has offered to take on more and more of the costs of the 
breeder program in order to make it attractive to 
industry. At first, the government was to contribute $50 
million, one-tenth the cost of the first demonstration 
plant. Then $100 million. Now the government is 
offering to pay $250 million, one-half the cost, and the 
nuclear industry is still unwilling to raise the matching 
money.85 
It may be that the industry is just holding out its cup 
and seeing how big a contribution the taxpayers can be 
forced to make.86 However, the great AEC and 
administration pressure that was applied in attempts to 
get the matching money suggest that the industry itself 
has looked at the investment and decided it is a bad one 
even in internal economic terms.87 ' 
I n conclusion, to highlight the importance of the omissions in the July 1971 AEC Draft Statement, let us compare, in tum, each of the 
major environmental impacts of the breeder and fusion 
plants. The breeder is expected to produce nearly as 
much waste heat as a proportion of total output as do 
present conventional power plants which are more 
efficient (waste less heat) than present fission reactors. 
Breeders may have 50 per cent thermal efficiency, 
compared with 41 per cent for present fossil fuel plants 
{and perhaps 50 per cent for advanced ones), and about 
32 per cent for present reactors.88 If steam turbines are 
required for fusion, they will probably be about 50 per 
cent efficient, but there is hope that fusion might allow 
direct electrostatic energy recovery which would push its 
efficiency very high indeed, an operating characteristic 
that could be extremely important to a thermally 
polluted world.89 
The breeder would produce numerous radioactive 
products within the plant, including krypton-85, 
Iodine-131 and tritium. The fusion reactor would 
produce only tritium, although in larger quantities than 
the breeder. David Rose, Director of Long Range 
Planning at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, suggests 
that the fusion reactor would have a substantial 
advantage over the breeder in containing these r<:1dio-
active products.90 
The breeder would use large amounts of liquid 
sodium, which is highly dangerous when it comes in 
contact with water or air. But most configurations of 
fusion reactors would involve similar amounts of lithium 
or fused salts and would involve similar dangers. 91 
Fusion would have a major advantage over the breeder 
in not having fuel reprocessing plants. Tritium would be 
recovered from the reactor and used on site for the fuel 
cycle.92 The other fuel, deuterium, would be burned up 
in the power production process, and the reaction would 
form the element helium, which would not be harmful 
or radioactive. Thus, the fusion plant would not have the 
difficult problems involved in transporting dangerous 
fuel to and from reprocessing plants. Removing the fuel 
reprocessing plants would reduce the opportunities for 
nuclear accidents and for the emission of radioactivity to 
workers or the public. It would :!!so diminish production 
of low-level radioactive wastes.93 
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The most important advantage of fusion over the 
breeder results from the nature of the fuel employed in 
each. The fusion plant uses only deuterium and tritium 
and produces helium, while the breeder depends on the 
highly toxic and long-lived plutonium and produces 
radioactive iodine as well. Deuterium and helium are 
common substances in nature and apparently not 
harmful. Tritium is radioactive and capable of entering 
the biological cycle as water (in T 2 0), but it is relatively 
benign in its radioactivity .94 On the other hand, 
although a fusion reactor would produce as many curies 
of radioactive tritium as a breeder would of iodine, the 
iodine is more dangerous because it is concentrated in 
living things and has higher energy radioactivity. 
Further, the use of hydrogen isotope fuel minimizes 
the risk of reactor explosion. The hazards of a meltdown 
in a plutonium breeder reactor were described earlier. In 
comparison, a fusion plant would have less than 1 gram 
of reacting nuclear mass at the core, far too little to 
explode.95 If the reactor did not work properly, the 
plasma would dissipate, giving up its energy to the walls 
of the reactor, but not providing any explosive increase 
in the heat released. 
Moreover, the fuel used in fusion is probably not so 
subject to the widespread production of nuclear 
weapons as is that of the breeder. The hydrogen isotopes 
will fuse only at extremely high temperatures, produce-
able only in reactors or in hydrogen bombs. But 
hydrogen bombs must themselves be triggered by atomic 
bombs. Thus, while the spread of breeder reactors and 
plutonium all over the world could provide plutonium 
for the nuclear armament of nearly every nation, and 
perhaps of small conspiracies within nations, it is at least 
possible that most types of fusion reactors could be 
placed all over the world without danger of bomb 
production, provided that all plutonium and other 
fissionable materials necessary for the atomic trigger 
bombs were controlled. On the other hand, attempts are 
being made to develop high-powered lasers as an 
alternative trigger for fusion weapons. These lasers 
would focus their energy on a small pellet of hydrogen 
isotope fuel, heating it to fusion temperatures before it 
could vaporize and disassemble. This technique, if 
successful, would provide a way either to produce 
electricity-or to ignite hydrogen bombs.96 
T he breeder reactor program is likely to be the first of many high-technology government programs_ to face the environmental assessment 
potentially available through full enforcement of the 
National Environmental Policy Act. The Atomic Energy 
Commission has been reluctant to comply with the Act, 
even though there has been some reorganization within 
the AEC to stress environmental matters and the 
development of fusion.97 
The suit brought by Scientists' Institute for Public 
Information against the AEC is an important attempt to 
force the AEC to develop an environmental impact 
statement for the whole LMFBR program-a program 
which is projected ultimately to.involve more than 2,000 
breeders throughout the United States at a cost of 
hundreds of billions of dollars. 98 William Reilly, of the 
Council on Environmental Quality staff, has character-
ized it in this way: "What these guys are asking for is a 
broad-gauged technological assessment. So far as I know, 
this is the first time such an expansive interpretation of 
the Act has come before the courts." 99 
Though the claims of SIPI are undoubtedly broad, 
they deal with a crucial subject. The legal arguments of 
SIPI are strong. The environmental case against breeder 
reactors, here briefly sketched, is disturbing and 
impressive. Yet the arguments for a broader impact 
statement by the AEC on the whole breeder reactor 
program succeed even if the environmental arguments 
are unconvincing. Environmental impact statements 
under the NEPA are not meant to set out just the 
evidence in favor of the final recommendation and 
decision of the federal agency concerned. Rather, they 
should provide a balanced background of the plausible 
environmental considerations. Without the benefit of 
this balanced background, final decisions in the public 
interest cannot be made. By this standard, the AEC's 
reluctant and limited concessions to the requirements of 
the NEPA are wholly inadequate. 
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